Are EU Trade Sanctions on Burma Compatible with WTO Law? by Howse, Robert L. & Genser, Jared M.
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 29 Issue 2 
2008 
Are EU Trade Sanctions on Burma Compatible with WTO Law? 
Robert L. Howse 
New York University Law School 
Jared M. Genser 
Council on Foreign Relations 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the European Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Organizations Law 
Commons, and the Transnational Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert L. Howse & Jared M. Genser, Are EU Trade Sanctions on Burma Compatible with WTO Law?, 29 
MICH. J. INT'L L. 165 (2008). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol29/iss2/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
ARE EU TRADE SANCTIONS ON BURMA
COMPATIBLE WITH WTO LAW?
Robert L. Howse*
Jared M. Genser**
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 166
II. BACKGROUND ON THE SITUATION IN BURMA .......................... 168
A . H istory ............................................................................... 168
B. H uman Rights Abuses ........................................................ 169
1. Political Repression ..................................................... 169
2. D estruction of Villages ................................................ 170
3. Forced L abor ............................................................... 171
4. Sexual V iolence ........................................................... 172
5. C hild Soldiers .............................................................. 173
III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO BURMA's HUMAN
R IGHTS A BU SES ........................................................................ 174
A. The European Union Common Position ............................ 174
B. Position of the United States .............................................. 176
C. Sanctions Compatibility with the WTO .............................. 178
IV. OVERVIEW OF WTO LAW ........................................................ 179
A. Most Favored Nation Status (Article I) .............................. 180
B. General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
(A rticle X I) ......................................................................... 18 1
C. Principle of National Treatment (Article III) ..................... 181
V. ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE XX EXCEPTIONS TO THE GATT .......... 182
A. "Necessary to Protect Public Morals"-Article XX(a) ..... 184
1. "Public M orals" ................................ .......................... 184
2. "N ecessary" ................................... ............................. 188
B. The "Chapeau" ofArticle XX ........................................... 191
VI. A NTI-CIRCUMVENTION ............................................................. 194
V II. C ONCLU SION ............................................................................. 196
* Robert L. Howse (B.A. University of Toronto 1980; L.L.B. University of Toronto
1989; L.L.M. Harvard Law School 1990) is the Lloyd C. Nelson Professor of International
Law at New York University Law School.
** Jared M. Genser (B.S. Cornell University 1995; M.P.P. Harvard University 1998;
J.D. University of Michigan Law School 2001) is an attorney in Washington, D.C., and a Term
Member of the Council on Foreign Relations. For the purposes of full disclosure, Mr. Genser
currently represents Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary of Burma's National League for
Democracy (NLD), with regards to her arbitrary detention under house arrest. Both she and
the NLD have long advocated the use of sanctions against the Burmese junta, but this Article
is written in Mr. Genser's personal capacity. Particular gratitude is due to Nicole Carelli for
her research and editorial assistance.
Michigan Journal of International Law
Within a system which denies the existence of basic human
rights, fear tends to be the order of the day. Fear of imprison-
ment, fear of torture, fear of death, fear of losing friends, family,
property or means of livelihood, fear of poverty fear of isola-
tion, fear of failure .... Yet even under the most crushing state
machinery courage rises up again and again, for fear is not the
natural state of civilized man.
-Aung San Suu Kyi
I. INTRODUCTION
For nearly twenty years, Burma has posed a seemingly insur-
mountable challenge to the international community. The former
democracy is mired in economic and social stagnation, and its people
are controlled by a repressive and abusive military regime. Faced with
these obstacles, world leaders have struggled to develop an appropriate
response. The United States has imposed an import and investment
ban; the European Union and Japan have chosen more limited "tar-
geted" sanctions. Still others such as China and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have tried active engagement and
cooperation. Despite these efforts, former Czech Republic President
Vdtclav Havel and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who pressed for action
on Burma in the U.N. Security Council, said that the country's "trou-
bles are causing serious and possibly permanent problems that go well
beyond human rights violations ... [it] has now become a problem for
the region and international community."'
This Article will explore the European Union's approach to Burma.
The European Union, until recently, has implemented quite limited
trade sanctions against the Burmese junta. According to the most recent
figures, E.U. countries still import €306 million ($454 million) of
commodities and products, ninety-five percent of which are textiles,
timber, gems, and precious metals.2 However, the Common Position of
November 19, 2007, strengthens considerably E.U. measures against
the Burmese regime and contains a ban on the importation of these
1. Vdclav Havel & Desmond M. Tutu, Forward to DLA PIPER RUDNICK GRAY CARY
US LLP, THREAT TO THE PEACE: A CALL FOR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACT IN BURMA
(2005) [hereinafter HAVEL-TUTu REPORT].
2. Response to Question P5253/07 submitted by Glenys Kinnock, Member of Eur.
Parliament, Nov. 19, 2007 (on file with the author) [hereinafter Kinnock Response].
[Vol. 29:165
EU Trade Sanctions
goods from Burma.' Further, the Common Position requires E.U. coun-
tries to prohibit intentional and knowing "participation" in activities
that "directly or indirectly" have the "object or effect" of circumvent-
ing this ban; this could include the transshipment of banned materials
from countries other than Burma, which may have been processed or
altered in some way so that they do not qualify as imports of Burmese
origin under the rules of origin that apply to imports into the European
Community as a general matter.
During the debate in the European Union over strengthening sanc-
tions against Burma, concerns were raised by the European
Commission that more restrictive sanctions could violate Member State
commitments to relevant treaties enforceable by the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO). This Article will argue that the expanded trade
sanctions against Burma in the Common Position are clearly compati-
ble with membership in the WTO in that they can be justified under
Article XX (General Exceptions) to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT).
We will begin in Part II with a brief overview of Burmese history
and a summary of the junta's record on human rights. Next, in Part III,
we will outline the contrasting positions of the European Union and the
United States, and discuss the European Union's concerns that more
stringent restrictions might violate the WTO. In Part IV, we will dis-
cuss the provisions of the GATT that could potentially prohibit trade
sanctions, and in Part V, we will discuss the Article XX exceptions to
the GATT, and explain that trade sanctions can be justified under Arti-
cle XX(a) as being "necessary to protect public morals."5 Finally, in
Part VI, we will discuss the WTO issues raised by the anti-
circumvention provisions in the expanded E.U. sanctions regime, that
are intended to deal with situations in which an economic actor would
attempt to get around the sanctions by, inter alia, transshipping goods
through a third country (e.g. India).
3. Council Common Position (EC) No. 2007/750/CFSP of 19 November 2007 amend-
ing Common Position 2006/318/CFSP renewing restrictive measures against Burma/Myanmar
art. 2(b), 2007 O.J. (L308) I [hereinafter Common Position No. 2007/750/CFSP].
4. Id. art. 2(e).
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(a), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I 1,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 1947].
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE SITUATION IN BURMA
A. History
Burma has been ruled by a military junta since 1962, when General
Ne Win led a military coup that seized power from the elected, repre-
sentative government.6  Ne Win abolished the constitution and
established a xenophobic military government that advocated the
"Burmese Way to Socialism."7 In the late 1980s, rising commodity
prices, rising debt, and periodic demonetization of Burmese currency
that wiped out the savings of most people led to the economy's col-
lapse in 1987. Non-violent anti-government demonstrations broke out
in Rangoon, and on August 8, 1988, military forces took violent action
against the demonstrators, killing thousands.8
After the August 8, 1988, massacre, a new ruling military junta
took control. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)
continued to suppress protesters, but pledged to hold multiparty elec-
tions." These elections occurred in 1990, and the main opposition party,
the National League for Democracy (NLD), won over eighty percent of
parliamentary seats.'0 In response, SLORC called the election invalid
and refused to relinquish control over the government."
After a failed promise to draft a new constitution, SLORC changed
its name in 1997 to the more benign-sounding State Peace and Devel-
opment Council (SPDC)."2 The SPDC has continued SLORC's
repressive authoritarian rule." Despite promises in 2003 to create a
"road map" to democracy, the SPDC retains control of Burma's execu-
tive, administrative, and judicial branches.'4 Corruption is widespread,'5
6. See U.S. Dep't of State, Background Note: Burma (December 2007), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm [hereinafter Background Note]; see also Columbia
Encyclopedia, Myanmar: History (6th ed. 2007), http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/lEl-
Myanmar.html [hereinafter Myanmar: History].
7. See Background Note, supra note 6.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. (reporting that the NLD won 392 of the 485 parliamentary seats).
11. See Myanmar: History, supra note 6.
12. See id.; see also David Lamb, Myanmar: New Military Rulers Continue an Old
Regime of Repression, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 1998, at 5.
13. See Background Note, supra note 6.
14. See Stephen McCarthy, Prospects for Justice and Stability in Burma, 46 ASIAN
SURV. 417, 425-26 (2006) (noting that "to date there has been little to no indication of any
realistic movement toward democratic structural change, via a 'roadmap' or otherwise").
15. See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION PERCEP-
TIONS INDEX 2007 27 (2007), available at http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/
surveysjindices/cpi/2007 (ranking Burma 179th of 179 countries in perceived corruption).
[Vol. 29:165
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and Burma is at the bottom of many world indicators on education,
health care delivery," and per capita gross domestic product (GDP)."
Burma attracted worldwide attention after a 100 percent increase in
the price of fuel and a 500 percent hike in the price of natural gas on
August 15, 2007, triggered the largest mass protests in the country since
1988.' 9 In the first two weeks of mass protest alone, the junta conducted
a brutal crackdown, killing nine and injuring thirty-one, according to
official reports. But many others, including British Prime Minister
Gordon Brown, indicated that they believed the numbers killed to be
much higher.20
B. Human Rights Abuses
Burma's record of on-going human rights abuses is among the worst
in the world. Although a detailed catalog of abuses is beyond the scope
of this paper, the following is a brief overview of the regime's treatment
of its own people.
1. Political Repression
The SPDC has widely restricted the activities of opposition groups
and has jailed or killed activists. NLD leaders Aung San Suu Kyi (winner
of the 1.991 Nobel Peace Prize) and U Tin Oo have been under house ar-
rest for most of the past eighteen years, despite widespread international
condemnation. The junta has forcibly closed all NLD offices except for
the main office in Rangoon.2' Additionally, the SPDC has yet to permit
16. See Education Statistics: Public Spending Per Student: Primary Level by Country,
http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/edu-pub spe-per-stu-pri-lev-spending-per-student-
primary-level (last visited Mar. 14, 2008) (reporting that Burma ranks 122nd of 126 countries
in primary education expenditures); Education Statistics: Public Spending Per Student: Sec-
ondary Level by Country, http://www.nationmaster.con/graph/edu-pub-spe-per stu-sec_
lev-spending-per-student-secondary-level (last visited Mar. 14, 2008) (reporting that Burma
ranks number 120 out of 123 countries in secondary education expenditures).
17. See BURMA CAMPAIGN UK, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BURMA: THE CASE FOR
TARGETED SANCTIONS 7 (2004), available at http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/reports/EU-
SanctionsReport.pdf (reporting that only two to four percent of the junta's spending is on
health care); WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000 154 (2000), available at
http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/whrOOen.pdf (reporting that Burma ranked 190th out of 191
countries in terms of overall health system attainment and performance).
18. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: COUNTRY FACT
SHEET MYANMAR (2006), available at http://akgul.bilkent.edu.tr/hdr/hdr2006/statistics/
countries/country-fact sheets/cty-fsMMR.html (reporting that Burma ranks 158th out of
172 countries in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita).
19. See Aye Aye Win, Myanmar's Economic Decline Fuels Unrest, USA TODAY, Sept.
29, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-09-29-1077302926_x.htm.
20. Edward Cody, Junta Restricts Protestors, Communications in Burna, WASH. POST,
Sept. 29, 2007, at A l.
21. Background Note, supra note 6.
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the 485-member elected legislative assembly to convene. "Prisoners of
conscience" are plentiful: human rights organizations report that over
1,100 political prisoners remain in Burmese prisons today, among them
elected members of Parliament." These prisoners face inhumane prison
conditions and torture, including sexual abuse and electric shocks.2 1 So-
called "trials" violate international fair trial standards, and are "con-
ducted according to laws which criminaliz[e] the peaceful exercise of
human rights. 24
2. Destruction of Villages
The SPDC and its predecessors have implemented a policy of de-
struction of villages and forced relocation of civilians for many decades,
primarily targeting ethnic minority groups.2 ' This destruction serves sev-
eral purposes: it operates as a counter-insurgency tactic; clears room for
government development projects; and furthers the policy of "Burmani-
zation" by destroying the culture of ethnic minorities.26 Between 1996
and 2007, over 3,000 villages in eastern Burma were "destroyed, relo-
cated[,] or abandoned. 27 Documenting a sampling of this destruction,
22. AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2007 191 (2007) (reporting
that "more than 1,185 political prisoners [were] held in deteriorating prison conditions");
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2007 248 (2007) (reporting that "[miore than 1,200
people are imprisoned for their political beliefs and activities"). The prison terms of some
prisoners have already expired, yet they remain incarcerated. The Penal Code allows the gov-
ernment to extend a prisoner's sentence even after the prisoner has completed the original
sentence, and authorities make regular use of this provision. U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2004:
Burma (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41637.htm
[hereinafter Dep't of State Report]. The government claims that it has released 19,906 prison-
ers since November 18, 2004, but estimates show that only 0.5 percent of those released were
political prisoners. Most prisoners released were petty criminals whose sentences had only
two or three more years to run. U.K. FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT
2005 37 (2005).
23. See generally ASSISTANCE Ass'N FOR POL. PRISONERS (BURMA), THE DARKNESS WE
SEE: TORTURE IN BURMA'S INTERROGATION CENTERS AND PRISONS (2005) (presenting a gen-
eral overview of torture in Burmese prisons and thirty-five firsthand accounts from former
prisoners).
24. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 22, at 192.
25. See generally GuY HORTON, DYING ALIVE: A LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BURMA 236 (2005); MARTIN SMITH, BURMA: INSURGENCY AND THE
POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 258-62 (1991).
26. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "THEY CAME AND DESTROYED OUR VILLAGE
AGAIN": THE PLIGHT OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN KAREN STATE 17 (2005),
available at http:llhrw.org/reports2005/burmaO65/burmaO6O5.pdf [hereinafter PLIGHT OF
KAREN] (noting that the government's "strategy has had military and ethnic dimensions, ....
allow[ing] for the spread of state-sponsored 'Burmanization,' in which minority cultures, his-
tories, and political aspirations would be eliminated in favor of a 'national' identity").
27. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE, BURMA: A WORSENING CRISIS OF
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 6 (2007).
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the American Association for the Advancement of Science has "released
satellite images showing charred villages, an increasing military pres-
ence, and swelling colonies of displaced people in rural regions of
Burma...
Forced relocation of civilians continues to the present day, and is of-
ten accompanied by massacres, systematic rape, forced labor, and
wholesale destruction of buildings, crops, and land in accordance with
"scorched earth" tactics.29 The government ensures that villagers do not
attempt to rebuild by declaring many areas "free-fire" or "brown" zones,
meaning that anyone found within the zone will be executed.3° As a re-
sult, since the 1960s, the military regime has created over one million
internally displaced persons (IDPs).3' After being forced from their
homes, IDPs are limited to only a few alternatives, including hiding in
the jungles, living on the fringes of rural and urban communities, or liv-
ing in zones of ongoing armed conflict.32
3. Forced Labor
Forced labor is a pervasive problem in Burma. The military junta
compels more than 800,000 Burmese to work as porters or laborers on
government infrastructure projects for little or no pay.33 Civilians are also
forced to support counter-insurgency operations, primarily as porters .
Many of these "convict porters" are worked to death, or used as "human
minesweepers. 3 ' Laborers who do not properly carry out their tasks are
often shot or beaten to death.36 In response to these unprecedented labor
28. Colin Nickerson, Satellite Images Show Burma's Plight, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29,
2007, at A3.
29. See HAVEL-TUTu REPORT, supra note 1, at 16-34.
30. THAILAND BURMA BORDER CONSORTIUM, INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT AND VUL-
NERABILITY IN EASTERN BURMA 8 (2004).
31. PLIGHT OF KAREN, supra note 26, at 18.
32. Id. at 8.
33. Burma Condemned Over Slave Labour, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2000, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/791688.stm (citing a trade union estimate); Marwaan
Macan-Markar, ILO Cracks the Whip at Yangon, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 25, 2005 (citing
an ILO estimate).
34. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 22, at 192 (noting that "[p]risoners were
reported to have increasingly been required to act as porters for the military ..."); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 22, at 249 (reporting that during a large military offensive in
Karen state, "[slcores of civilians were killed and thousands taken as forced porters to support
the operation. Prisoners were used as forced porters, and many of them were summarily exe-
cuted during operations").
35. KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP, LESS THAN HUMAN: CONVICT PORTERS IN THE
2005-2006 NORTHERN KAREN STATE OFFENSIVE 1 (2006).
36. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 22, at 192 (noting that "[a] number of prisoner
porters attempting to escape were reportedly killed"); AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY'S CONCERNS
AT THE 89TH INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE (2001), available at http://
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rights violations, in June 2000, the U.N. International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO), for the first time in its history, adopted a resolution under
Article 3337 of its constitution to compel the Government of Burma to
comply with its obligations under the Forced Labor Convention (No. 29)
of 1930.38 Rather than institute reforms, the Burmese Government has
instead given lengthy prison sentences to citizens who contact the ILO to
report forced labor violations.39 In June 2007, the ILO confirmed that the
Burmese government had not yet implemented any of its recommenda-
tions, and expressed "profound concern" at the continued "widespread"
imposition of forced labor in Burma.4°
4. Sexual Violence
The Burmese army is the primary perpetrator of sexual violence
against women, particularly against women who are members of ethnic
minorities.4' The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar
has noted that "the rape and sexual abuse of women and girls by gov-
ernment forces has been 'a regular feature in the mode of operation of
the army in its campaign of incursions into the insurgency zones or
elsewhere in the relocation sites.' ,42 These rapes serve as "entertain-
ment" for government forces, and "demoralize and weaken ethnic
web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGIOR420042001 (recounting reports by civilians who wit-
nessed the junta's murder of laborers who were unable to adequately perform their duties).
37. Article 33 of the ILO Constitution authorizes the Governing Body of the ILO to
"recommend ... such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance" with
recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry that has been established to investigate
violations of a labor convention. Constitution, Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes
of the International Labour Organization art. 33, May 10, 1944, 49 Stat. 2712, 15 U.N.T.S. 35.
38. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor (No. 29), June 28, 1930, 39
U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 1, 1932) (ratified by Burma on Mar. 4, 1955).
39. Forced Labor in Burma: Time for Action, ALTSEAN, Nov. 10, 2006, at 2 (reporting
that one defendant who had contacted the ILO received a twenty-five-year prison sentence,
while seven others received eight-year sentences).
40. Press Release, Int'l Labor Org., Conference Concludes With Adoption of New
Standards on Fishing Sector, Approaches to Sustainable Development and Measures to Pro-
mote Decent Work (June 15, 2007), http://www.ilo.org/global/About theILO/Media-and_
public-information/Pressjreleases/Iang--en/WCMS_0831 00/index.htm [hereinafter ILO Press
Release].
41. See SHAN HUMAN RIGHTS FOUND. & SHAN WOMEN'S ACTION NETWORK, LICENSE
TO RAPE: THE BURMESE MILITARY REGIME'S USE OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE ONGOING
WAR IN SHAN STATE 9 (2002). For a comprehensive overview of reports on rape in Burma
produced by domestic and international humanitarian organizations, see HORTON, supra note
25, at 322-98.
42. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Integration of the Human Rights of Women
and the Gender Perspective: Violence against Women, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/200t173 (Jan. 23,
2001) (quoting ECOSOC, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar: Report of the Special Rap-
porteur Mr Rajsoomer Lllah, Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights
Resolution 1999/17, 50, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/38 (Jan. 24, 2000)).
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nationality populations." Rapes of ethnic minority women are used stra-
tegically to "intimidate the local population, to extract information from
female detainees, and to extract bribes."" They also further "Burmaniza-
tion," a policy of ethnic cleansing according to human rights groups and
democracy activists.4'5 As a result of these atrocities, the U.N. General
Assembly adopted a resolution in 2003 "express[ing] grave concern at
... rapes and other forms of sexual violence carried out by members of
the armed forces" in Burma and the "disproportionate suffering of ethnic
minorities, women, and children from such violations."'
5. Child Soldiers
Burma has more child soldiers than any other country in the world.47
In 2002, an estimated 70,000 of Burma's 350,000 active-duty soldiers
were children, 8 and this number has remained virtually unchanged.4 9 The
army often captures boys in public places, such as train and bus stations
and markets. 0 Although eleven years appears to be the youngest age at
which children are pressed into the army, children below this age are
recruited and detained until they are of age.' Following a torturous train-
ing period in the Su Saun Yay recruit holding camps, where boys
frequently die from illness and beatings,52 the child soldiers are forced to
43. REFUGEES INT'L, No SAFE PLACE: BURMA'S ARMY AND THE RAPE OF ETHNIC
WOMEN 45 (2003).
44. See ECOSOC, supra note 42.
45. See, e.g., Dennis Bernstein & Leslie Kean, Burmese Military's Dirty Mission? Rape
Allegedly a New Weapon in Government's Anti-Ethnic Arsenal, BOSTON GLOBE, July 12,
1998, at D2.
46. G.A. Res. 57/231, U.N. Doc. AIRes/57/231 (Feb. 28, 2003).
47. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Demobilize Child Soldiers (June 4, 2004),
available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/04/burma8734txt.htm [hereinafter Demobi-
lize Child Soldiers].
48. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MY GUN WAS AS TALL As ME 3 (2002) [hereinafter My
GUN WAS As TALL AS ME].
49. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Burma: Use of Child Soldiers Continues Un-
abated (Sept. 12, 2004), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/09/l2/burmal 4179.htm
(noting that a new report "found that child recruitment rates remain essentially unchanged
compared to four years ago").
50. MY GUN WAS As TALL As ME, supra note 48, at 3-4 (reporting that recruiters
"stalk the railway, bus and ferry stations, the streets, marketplaces and festivals," and are re-
warded with money and bags of rice for each soldier they enlist). Police seeking to recruit
child soldiers often stop children to check their identification cards, even though identification
cards are not given to children. When the children are unable to produce identification cards,
they are taken to the police station and given the choice of enlisting in the army or spending
several years in prison. Id. at 3.
51. See id. at 4 (relaying the story of a boy who was kidnapped at ten and forced to
work as a servant for three years before becoming a soldier).
52. See id. at 2, 5 (noting that during training, the children are "subject to beatings and
systematic humiliation," and that those attempting to escape are beaten and placed in crowded
holding cells).
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carry out human rights abuses and engage in battles against armed ethnic
opposition groups.53 The children are isolated from their families and
"brutalized by their commanders," who "beat them for little or no rea-
son" and "steal their pay and their rations.54 As a result, some child
soldiers see suicide as their only option. 5  Burma's continued use of child
soldiers not only contravenes U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1460
and 1612, but also violates Burma's obligations as a signatory to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.56
III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO BURMA'S HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
The international response to the junta's political repression and hu-
man rights abuses has varied widely, from active trade (China) to limited
sanctions (European Union) to an import and investment ban (United
States). In this Part, we will briefly discuss the sanction regimes of the
European Union and the United States, and then outline the European
Union's concern that tightening sanctions might violate WTO commit-
ments.
At the outset, it is particularly important to note that Burma's Na-
tional League for Democracy which, along with its allies, won more than
eighty percent of the seats in Burma's Parliament in its 1990 elections,
has long been a supporter of sanctions.
A. The European Union Common Position
The European Union has formally maintained limited sanctions
against Burma since 1996, citing as justification the junta's "absence of
progress towards democratization" and "the continuing violation of hu-
53. See HUMAN RIGHTS EDUC. INST. OF BURMA, DESPITE PROMISES: CHILD SOLDIERS IN
BURMA'S SPDC ARMED FORCES 7 (2006) (noting that the children are "forced to perpetrate vio-
lence and commit human rights violations," including "destroying villages suspected of
supporting ethnic insurgent movements" and "extrajudicial killings"); Demobilize Child Soldiers,
supra note 47 (reporting that child soldiers often are required to "roun[d] up villagers for
forced labor, bur[n] villages, and carr[y] out executions").
54. My GUN WAS As TALL AS ME, supra note 48, at 6.
55. See HUMAN RIGHTS EDUC. INST. OF BURMA, supra note 53, at 7; My GUN WAS AS
TALL AS ME, supra note 48, at 6.
56. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (noting
that Burma acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on July 15, 1991).
57. The NLD has long supported trade sanctions on Burma. The reason for this policy
is best understood by the statement made by Aung San Suu Kyi: "Until we have a system that
guarantees rule of law and basic democratic institutions, no amount of aid or investment will
benefit our people. Profits from business enterprises will merely go toward enriching a small,
already privileged elite." Take Your Investments Elsewhere, Please, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 30, 1998,
at 52.
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man rights." 8 The current sanctions regime includes six major compo-
nents: (1) an arms embargo; (2) the expulsion of military attach6s; (3) a
visa ban on senior SPDC officials and associates; (4) a ban on non-
humanitarian aid; (5) an assets freeze on the funds of senior SPDC offi-
cials and associates; and (6) a limited investment ban.5 9 The European
Union also suspended Burma's Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) benefits in 1997 over the regime's use of forced labor.
Despite several seemingly-restrictive components, the effect of the
E.U. sanctions regime prior to the November 2007 Common Position
was minimal. First, some elements proved largely symbolic: despite the
expulsion of attach6s, the European Union continues to host a full Am-
bassador to Burma.60 Similarly, the E.U. arms embargo served little
purpose, as the regime was well-supplied with weapons and military
equipment from trading partners China, Russia, and India.6 ' Further,
many of the sanctions measures were riddled with exceptions. The visa
ban, for instance, contains exceptions for intergovernmental meetings
and international conferences, thus merely serving to prevent junta offi-
cials from vacationing in the European Union, which they were not
doing in any case.62 Similarly, the ban on non-humanitarian aid exempts
projects that are "in support of human rights" programs involving health,
education, or environmental protection, and projects that "buil[d] the
capacity of civil society."63 While this made sense, there was minimal aid
from the European Union that previously was outside of these catego-
ries. In addition, the investment ban applied only to certain state-run
58. The European Union first formally adopted sanctions against Burma in Council
Position 96/365/CFSP, which implemented a visa ban and suspended diplomatic visits to
Burma. Council Common Position (EC) No. 96/365/CFSP of 28 October 1996, 1996 O.J. (L
287) 1. The 1996 CFSP also "reaffirmed" an arms embargo, suspension of non-humanitarian
aid, and the withdrawal of military attachds; it is likely that these measures had been previ-
ously implemented through an informal agreement among Member States. Stockholm Int'l
Peace Res. Inst., The EU Arms Embargo and Trade Restrictions on Burma (Myanmar) (2005),
available at http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/euburma.html. The CFSP is renewed and
revised every six months. Major updates were made in 2000 (assets freeze) and 2004 (limited
investment ban). For a complete timeline of developments, see Peter G. Peterson Inst. for Int'l
Economics, Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism: Burma (Myanmar) (2007), available at
http://www.iie.conresearch/topics/sanctions/myanmar.cfm. The current E.U. sanctions legis-
lation is Council Position 2006/318/CFSP. Common Position No. 20071750/CFSP, supra note
3.
59. Commission Regulation 481/2007, 2007 O.J. (L 11I) 50, 50.
60. ALTSEAN, SPECIAL REPORT: READY, AIm, SANCTION! 40 (2003), available at
http://www.altsean.orgfDocs/PDF%20Format/Special%2OReports/Ready%2OAim%2OSanctio
n.pdf.
61. See Myanmar: Dirty Dealings, ECONOMIST, May 26, 2007, at 7 (discussing Chinese
and Russian arms sales to the junta and investments in Burmese state-run oil and gas ven-
tures).
62. See Commission Regulation 481/2007, supra note 59.
63. Id.
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enterprises listed in an attached annex. These enterprises included a
brewery, a pineapple juice company, several steel companies, and a
number of mines and mills, 64 but noticeably omitted several of the largest
state-run companies, including Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise
(MOGE), Myanmar Timber Enterprise (MTE), and Myanmar Post and
Telecommunications (MPT).6 E.U. companies thus remained free to
fund these key enterprises: France's Total Oil alone provided the junta
with an estimated $450 million per year through investments in MOGE.66
Finally, some aspects of the sanctions regime were hampered by the
junta's lack of European connections. The assets freeze, for instance,
only affected the European holdings of junta officials,67 which are mini-
mal .68
The November 2007 Common Position largely corrects these short-
comings. With respect to trade measures, the focus of this Article, the
ban in the new Common Position on imports of textiles, timber, gems,
and precious metals would have a real impact on the Burmese junta by
costing it at least €288 million ($410 million) per year on the imports
alone. 69
B. Position of the United States
The United States maintains the most comprehensive trade sanctions
against Burma.7 ° Sanctions were first implemented after the July 8, 1988,
massacre, which led the United States to impose an arms embargo and
64. Id. annex II.
65. EU Sanctions on Burma: No Sanctions at All: An Analysis of the New EU
Common Position, BURMA CAMPAIGN UK, Dec. 13, 2004, available at http://www.
burmacampaign.org.uk/cpanalysis.html.
66. BURMA CAMPAIGN UK, TOTALITARIAN OIL 7 (2005), available at http://
www.burmacampaign.org.uk/PDFs/total%20report.pdf.
67. Notably, the assets freeze does not apply to the European assets of Burma's state-
run enterprises, which may be more substantial. See BURMA CAMPAIGN UK, supra note 17, at
15.
68. In 2006, for example, the U.K. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs acknowledged that "those on the assets freeze list are unlikely to hold bank accounts in the
[United Kingdom] or the [European Union]:' and reported that the United Kingdom had frozen
only £3,576.65 in junta assets, 451 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th set.) (2006) 465W, available at
http://www.pubications.parliament.uk/pa/cm2OO5O6/cmhansrdlcm06 l0 I/text/61 101 wOO12.htm.
69. See Kinnock Response, supra note 2.
70. Behind the United States and the European Union, Canada maintains the most
comprehensive sanctions regime. Canada has suspended diplomatic relations with Burma,
bans most bilateral and multilateral aid, limits exports to humanitarian goods, and has
eliminated applicable trade preferences. See For. Aff. & Int'l Trade Canada, Country
Overview-Burma (Myanmar) (June 2003), http://www.infoexport.gc.ca/ie-en/
DisplayDocument.jsp?did= 1272.
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ban all non-humanitarian aid.7' The United States also began to use its
influence in international organizations to block multilateral funding and
loans to Burma, and in 1994, "threatened to reduce ... funding to any
United Nations agencies found to be conducting programs in Burma."72
In 1997, the U.S. sanctions were supplemented by Executive Order
13,047, which prohibited all new investment in Burma by U.S. persons
or entities.73 The final components of the U.S. sanctions regime were put
into place in 2003, after an attack by junta forces on a convoy transport-
ing Aung San Suu Kyi. In response to this attack, Congress passed the
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act (BFDA). This legislation imple-
mented a number of new sanctions measures, including a ban on all
Burmese imports, an assets freeze of SPDC officials, a visa ban on
SPDC officials, and a ban on exporting financial services to Burma.74
Later in 2003, the Treasury Department blacklisted two major Burmese
banks because of ties to drug traffickers, a move that barred the banks
from doing any business with U.S. financial institutions.75 Since then, the
State Department has found "no measurable progress toward political
liberalization" in Burma, and the sanctions have been consistently re-
newed and tightened further, most recently in July 2008.76 As of 2003,
U.S. banks had frozen over $320,000 in Burmese assets, and as of 2004,
the Treasury Department had blocked $13.3 million worth of financial
transactions with Burmese entities. 77
The U.S. sanctions have unquestionably had "the most severe and
78damaging impact" on the junta. In the year before the BFDA was
passed, Burma exported $356 million in goods to the United States-
approximately 15 percent of total exports.7 9 The BFDA not only halted
this trade, but directly deprived the junta of revenue from its ten percent
export tax. 80 Further, the U.S. ban on aid halted United States Agency for
71. Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung & Paul Sarno, Myanmar Impasses: Alternatives to
Isolation and Engagement?, 14 ASIAN J. POL. Sci. 40, 43-44 (2006).
72. Id. at 44.
73. U.S. Dep't of State, 2005 Investment Climate Statement-Burma (2005), http://
www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2005/41990.htm.
74. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT US SANCTIONS
AGAINST BURMA (MYANMAR) 1 (2005), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/
enforcement/ofac/programs/burma/burma.pdf.
75. See William Barnes, Burma Put on Dirty Money Blacklist by US, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
21, 2003, at 4.
76. See Bush 77ghtens Sanctions on Myanmar Junta, Targets Gem Trade, BLOOMBERG,
July 30, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=azNisu9OXDvo&
refer='asia.
77. U.S. Dep't of State, 2005 Report on US Trade Sanctions Against Burma (Apr. 28,
2004), http://www.state.gov/pleap/rlslrpt/32106.htm.
78. Thawnghmung & Samo, supra note 71, at 47.
79. ALTSEAN, supra note 60, at 25-26.
80. Id. at 25.
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International Development (USAID) funding that had averaged $10.3
million per year.8 Even more significantly, U.S. influence in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and other international
organizations has reduced multilateral aid to Burma by an estimated
$111 million per year.8
2
In the wake of the September 2007 crackdown on mass demonstra-
tions, fourteen senior regime officials were added to the Department of
the Treasury's Specially-Designated Nationals (SDN) list, including Sen-
ior General Than Shwe.83
C. Sanctions Compatibility with the WTO
Although the U.S. ban on Burmese imports has been in place since
2003 (and more limited sanctions for years prior), the military junta has
never brought a challenge before the WTO. 4 This is not surprising: the
junta has been under significant international pressure to restore democ-
racy and end its human rights abuses and a challenge before the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body would invite a detailed examination of the
junta's actions in dispute settlement proceedings.
Perhaps more significantly, a comprehensive review of U.S. trade
policies pursuant to the World Trade Organization Trade Policy Review
Mechanism (TPRM), undertaken after the U.S. Burma import ban had
come into force, does not cite the ban as an issue for U.S. compliance
with WTO rules; indeed the U.S. TPR only mentions the ban in pass-
85ing.
Nevertheless, some E.U. officials had privately cited the WTO as
justification for opposing the amendment of the earlier E.U. Common
Position, arguing that additional trade restrictions would violate WTO
obligations. Back in 1998, the European Union brought a WTO chal-
lenge against the United States regarding Massachusetts' selective-
purchasing law that would have prevented public monies in the state
81. Id. at 35-36.
82. Thawnghmung & Sarno, supra note 71, at 47.
83. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Recent OFAC
Actions, Sept. 27, 2007, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
actions/20070927.shtml.
84. The junta has, however, publicly criticized the U.S. position. See, e.g., Myanmar
Slams US Sanctions, CNN.coM, July 29, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/
southeast/07/29/myanmar.suukyi/index.html (reporting that Burma's Foreign Minister Win
Aung "lashed out" against the newly-passed BFDA, telling reporters that "[s]anctions are one-
sided, unilateral actions taken by some without any regard for the people").
85. See Trade Policy Review Body, World Trade Org. Secretariat, Trade Policy Review
of the United States of America, 114, WTrTPR/S/160/Rev. I (June 20, 2006) ("The United
States bans imports from certain countries for foreign policy purposes. Most imports from ...
Myanmar [and other countries listed].., are subject to bans or approval requirements.").
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from indirectly benefiting the military junta in Burma.86 Although the
law was struck down in U.S. courts solely on domestic constitutional
grounds before the WTO case was heard, that challenge is evidence of an
aggressive approach that the European Union had taken previously on
Burma sanctions.
In the next Parts, we argue that the enhanced E.U. trade sanctions
against Burma are fully compatible with WTO law.
IV. OVERVIEW OF WTO LAW
The WTO was established on January 1, 1995, at the conclusion of
the Uruguay Round negotiations on the GATT. Due to disputes regarding
the European Union's competency to ratify such a comprehensive
agreement, the European Union87 and each constituent Member State are
Contracting Parties to the WTO.8 The WTO was established to serve as
a forum for continuing trade liberalization and to oversee the various
agreements governing free trade among the Contracting Parties.89 The
WTO further serves as the common institutional framework for
administering trade relations among its members in matters annexed 9° to
the WTO charter.9' Furthermore, the WTO creates a unified dispute
settlement system92 that has exclusive and (in effect) compulsory
86. The Massachusetts law prevented state agencies from contracting with companies
doing business in Burma. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22G-M (West 2008). The Euro-
pean Union argued that this provision violated the WTO Government Procurement
Agreement, but agreed to suspend the WTO case while the law was challenged in U.S. courts.
The Supreme Court overturned the law based on federal supremacy over foreign affairs, moot-
ing the WTO dispute. See generally Robert Strumberg & Matthew C. Porterfield, Who
Preempted the Massachusetts Burma Law? Federalism and Political Accountability Under
Global Trade Rules, 31 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Summer 2001, at 173.
87. While technically it is the European Community, rather than the European Union,
that is a party to the WTO and negotiates on behalf of the E.U. Member States, we will refer
to the European Union for simplicity.
88. See Meinhard Hilf, The ECJ's Opinion 1/94 on the WTO-No Surprise, but Wise?, 6
EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1995).
89. See JOHN H. JACKSON, The World Trade Organization: Watershed Innovation or
Cautious Small Step Forward?, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & THE WTO 399 (2000).
90. This includes, among other agreements, the original and amended GAT'. GAIT
1947, supra note 5; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I A, THE LEGAL TEXTS:
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999),
1867 U.N.T.S. 190, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
91. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. II(l),
Apr. 15, 1994, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter
Marrakesh Agreement].
92. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
art. II(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
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jurisdiction to hear disputes arising under each of the WTO Agreements.
As a general proposition, economic sanctions could potentially be
inconsistent with several provisions of the GATT, including Article I
(Most Favored Nation Status), Article XI (General Elimination of
Quantitative Restrictions), and Article 11(4) (National Treatment).
A. Most Favored Nation Status (Article I)
Within the WTO, Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment applies to
all duties, charges, advantages, favors, privileges, and immunities im-
posed on, or granted to, any other WTO Member.93 MFN treatment
means that a WTO Member cannot improve the benefits that it accords
any other Member unless it equally improves benefits to all Members.94
Accordingly, Members must treat goods "originating" in one Member
State no less favorably than goods "originating" in other Member States.
Under the Agreement on the Rules of Origin, goods are deemed to
"originate" either in the Member State territory in which they were
wholly produced or in the territory in which they underwent their most
recent "substantial transformation." 95 Thus, MFN status attaches even to
Member goods that incorporate "substantially transformed" materials
from a sanctioned, non-Member country.
Article I, then, prevents Member States from imposing trade sanc-
tions on other WTO Members to the extent that this entails less favorable
treatment of "like products" from the sanctioned State. Without a valid
• 96
exception, MFN principles prevent Members from reducing benefits to
one Member (in this case, restricting imports and/or exports) without
similarly reducing benefits to all other Members. Additionally, Article I
would prevent Members from imposing economic sanctions on WTO
Members who incorporate "substantially transformed" materials from a
sanctioned, non-WTO Member country into their exported goods (for
example, using Cuban cotton in clothing). Under the WTO Rules of Ori-
gin, these goods would be deemed to have originated in the territory of
the WTO Member State, and not the territory of the non-Member coun-
try. Accordingly, the principle of MFN would prevent the Member from
Annex 2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994); Marrakesh
Agreement, supra note 91, art. 1(1).
93. See GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. 1(1).
94. See id.
95. See Agreement on Rules of Origin art. 111(b), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 22347 (1999), 1868
U.N.T.S. 397 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Rules of Origin].
96. See infra Part VI.
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restricting trade without similarly disadvantaging all other WTO Mem-
bers.
B. General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions (Article XI)
In addition to the MFN principle, the GA'I" includes specific provi-
sions to eliminate non-tariff barriers to trade and to promote greater
market access. Article XI of the GATT prohibits WTO members from
imposing import or export restrictions on goods originating from, or des-
tined to a Member State's territory.97 Restrictions such as quotas, import
or export licenses, and other measures that have the effect of creating a
non-tariff restriction are specifically prohibited.9 Article XI's only ex-
ceptions are for preventing crucial shortages of essential goods, grading
or classifying commodities, or enforcing certain governmental measures
relating to agriculture or fishing.99
Article XI of the GAT" prevents a WTO Member from imposing
trade sanctions that would limit exports to another Member State, or
sanctions that would restrict the importation of goods originating from
another Member State.'00 For example, Article XI would prohibit the
United States from imposing licensing requirements on the importation
of Canadian food products that incorporate Cuban sugar or, alternatively,
from imposing import restrictions on the goods of any Member State
that trades with Cuba. 10
C. Principle of National Treatment (Article III)
Finally, Article II(4)'s "national treatment" standard might prohibit
trade sanctions depending on how such sanctions were devised and im-
plemented. Under the national treatment principle, a Member is
permitted to impose regulatory requirements on imported goods, pro-
vided that these goods are treated no less favorably than like domestic
goods.' 2 For example, if the European Union were to introduce rules
requiring that all manufactured goods comply with certain labor standards,
these measures would have to comply with Article 11(4) and be imple-
mented in a non-discriminatory fashion. It is an open question whether
goods would be considered "unlike" by virtue of the labor standards that
97. See GAT 1947, supra note 5, art. XI(l).
98. See id.
99. See id. art. XI(2).
100. See id. art. XI.
101. Note that these measures might still be justified by one of the GATT's exceptions.
See supra Part VI. For a history of the E.U. challenge to the Helms-Burton Act, see generally
Harry L. Clark, Dealing with Extraterritorial Sanctions and Foreign Countermeasures, 20 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 61, 91-96 (1999).
102. See GAIT 1947, supra note 5, art. 1I(4).
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are applied in the context of their production (the so-called prod-
uct/process controversy), but there is no textual basis in Article 111(4) to
exclude differences that relate to production methods, especially where
those differences matter from the perspective of the values of consumers
in the importing country.0 3 However, Article 111(4) only applies when the
measure in question is a "single measure" aimed at domestic and im-
ported products, even if applied to imports differently, i.e., at the
border.'°4
V. ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE XX EXCEPTIONS TO THE GATT
On a prima facie basis then, Articles I, III, and XI of the GATT po-
tentially restrict WTO Member States from imposing trade sanctions
against other WTO Members. These articles, however, cannot be read
alone. In fact, the GATT contains broad exceptions and definitional limi-
tations that effectively permit policy-makers to avoid WTO obligations
without facing recourse from the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.' 5 Spe-
cifically, a Member can justify restrictive measures under the Article XX
General Exceptions.
The Article XX exceptions provide that a Member may impose oth-
erwise GATT-illegal measures under two distinct conditions. First, the
measure must fall into one of ten categories, including:
(a) necessary to protect public morals;
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agree-
ment, including those relating to customs enforcement, the
enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of
Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, trade
103. For an argument that Article 111(4) of the GAT'T permits a wide range of human
rights related measures, including conditioning the sale of any product, domestic or imported,
on production methods consistent with respect for labor rights, see Robert Howse, Brian
Langille & Julien Burda, The World Trade Organization and Labour Rights: Man Bites Dog,
in SOCIAL ISSUES, GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: LABOUR RIGHTS AND
THE EU, ILO, OECD, AND WTO, 157, 157-231 (VIRGINIA A. LEARY & DANIEL WARNER
eds., 2006).
104. See Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and As-
bestos-Containing Products, WT/DS I 35/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
105. See GATr 1947, supra note 5, art. XX.
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marks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive prac-
tices.' 6
Second, a trade-restrictive measure must comply with Article XX's cha-
peau: it cannot be "applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail," and it cannot be "a disguised restriction on
international trade."'
0 7
During the GATT era, the United States-Tuna/Dolphin rulings,
never adopted by the GATT Membership as binding on the parties to the
dispute, established the notion that Article XX of the GATT could not be
used to justify trade measures targeted at the policies of exporting coun-
tries.' O In United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products (United States-Shrimp/Turtle), however, the Appellate
Body of the WTO held exactly the reverse, stating:
It appears to us, however, that conditioning access to a Mem-
ber's domestic market on whether exporting Members comply
with, or adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by the
importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of
measures falling within the scope of one or another of the excep-
tions (a) to (j) of Article XX. Paragraphs (a) to (j) comprise
measures that are recognized as exceptions to substantive obli-
gations established in the GATT 1994, because the domestic
policies embodied in such measures have been recognized as
important and legitimate in character. It is not necessary to as-
sume that requiring from exporting countries compliance with,
or adoption of, certain policies (although covered in principle by
one or another of the exceptions) prescribed by the importing
country, renders a measure a priori incapable of justification
under Article XX. Such an interpretation renders most, if not all,
of the specific exceptions of Article XX inutile, a result abhor-
rent to the principles of interpretation we are bound to apply.'°
In this Part, we argue that the enhanced sanctions in the November
2007 Common Position can be justified through the Article XX(a) ex-
ception, "necessary to protect public morals." As previously discussed,
106. Id.
107. Id. (preambular paragraph).
108. Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R-
39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991), GATI B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) (Tuna/Dolphin I); Report
of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (June 16, 1994), 33
I.L.M. 839 (1994) (not adopted) (Tuna/Dolphin II).
109. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DSF8/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter United States-Shrimp/Turtle].
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Article XX exceptions require a two-tiered analysis: first, the measure
must fit within one of the prescribed categories, and, second, the meas-
ure must adhere to the requirements of the chapeau."° According to the
procedure established in United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline,' we will first address the category, and then
discuss the chapeau.
A. "Necessary to Protect Public Morals "-Article XX(a)
In United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services (United States-Gambling), the WTO
dispute settlement organs addressed the concept of public morals for the
first and only. time, in the course of interpreting an exception in the Gen-
eral Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that has broadly similar,
though not identical, wording to that in GATT XX(a)." 2 The Dispute Set-
tlement Panel and the Appellate Body identified two separate
components for analysis: the definition of "public morals" and the defi-
nition of "necessary." We will consider each in turn.
1. "Public Morals"
In United States-Gambling, the dispute settlement organs had to
decide whether the U.S. prohibition on Internet gambling was a measure
"necessary to protect public morals." In its approach to the interpretation
of this language, the WTO Panel displayed considerable deference to the
value choices of the WTO Member defending its measures, in this case
the United States. "The content of these concepts for Members can vary
in time and space, depending upon a range of factors, including prevail-
ing social, cultural, ethical and religious values.""' 3 Analogizing to past
Appellate Body decisions concerning similar provisions, the Panel con-
cluded that "Members should be given some scope to define and apply
110. Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, 22, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
Ill. Id.; see also United States-Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 109, 91 118-19 (confirming
that the chapeau should be considered second).
. 112. Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Sup-
ply of Gambling and Betting Services, U 296-99, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005)
[hereinafter United States-Gambling Appellate Body Report]. Although this case concerned
the Article XIV exceptions to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Appel-
late Body noted that the exceptions were set out "in the same manner" as in Article XX of the
GAT, and thus analogized the two sections. Id. $ 291.
113. Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gam-
bling and Betting Services, 16.461, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter United
States-Gambling Panel Report].
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for themselves the concepts of 'public morals' . . . in their respective ter-
ritories, according to their own systems and scales of values.""
4
This flexibility notwithstanding, the Panel determined that "we must
nonetheless give meaning to these terms in order to apply them to the facts
of in [sic] this case. '""' Considering the definitions of "public" and "mor-
als" from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the Panel at length
concluded that "'public morals' denotes standards of right and wrong
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.""6 Al-
though this portion of the Panel's decision was not appealed, the Appellate
Body quoted this definition in its final decision, indicating some support
for this reasoning."7
Finally, to add context to this definition, the Panel looked at past
precedent by other WTO Members, as well as similar language in other
international agreements. The Panel first noted that several other WTO
Members had used the public morals exception to justify gambling-
related restrictions.'" Next, the Panel examined the use of "moral" in a
League of Nations draft convention, noting that this exception was
thought to include lottery tickets." 9 The Panel also discussed past deci-
sions of the European Court of Justice, which had allowed E.U. Member
States to restrict gambling-related activities despite E.U. free trade
rules. 20 Applying all the above considerations to the United States-
Gambling case, the Panel determined that gambling-related restrictions
fell under the "moral" exception so long as they were enforced "in pur-
suance of policies, the object and purpose of which is to 'protect public
morals.' ,,121
Applying the United States-Gambling Panel's reasoning, there is
ample support for the inclusion of human rights standards in the defini-
tion of "public morals." First, the Panel's overall approach demonstrates
that the WTO does not intend to "second-guess" a Member's assessment
of its own public moral standards. The Panel noted that these standards
will "vary in time and space," and that "Members should be given some
scope to define and apply [them] for themselves.' 22 This is not to say
that the Appellate Body would countenance any definition-the WTO
would undoubtedly reject a trade embargo with a purely specious justifi-
cation unrelated to shared public values as reflected in law, regulation,
114. Id.
115. Id. 6.462.
116. Id. 6.465.
117. United States-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 112, $ 296.
118. United States-Gambling Panel Report, supra note 113, 1 6.47 1.
119. Id. T 6.472.
120. Id. at 369 n.914.
121. Id. 6.474.
122. Id. 6.461.
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and policy. Human rights abuses (such as Burma's political repression,
destruction of villages, forced labor, sexual violence, and the use of child
soldiers) are repugnant to public values widely embodied in laws, regu-
lations, and policies, and indeed judicial decisions at the highest level. In
fact, trading with a country that engages in these practices invokes two
different kinds of moral concerns. As a general matter, any formal asso-
ciation with an abusive foreign government can violate a Member's
public morals: this is the underlying rationale behind many government
decisions to sever diplomatic relations with abusive regimes. Addition-
ally, the act of trading with an abusive regime raises the more specific
concern of complicity: exchanging money for goods that are produced
even indirectly with the support of forced labor perpetuates this practice.
For these reasons, it is likely that the Dispute Settlement Body would
give deference to a Member's declaration that a trade embargo is neces-
sary to protect public morals.
Considering the United States-Gambling Panel's dictionary defini-
tion lends further support to this argument. Human rights standards are
clearly "standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on be-
half of' Member States, as most Members maintain statutory and
customary bans on human rights abuses. For example, all E.U. Members
are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights.' 23 This
legally binding instrument specifically rejects political repression,'2 the
destruction of land and property,'25 and forced labor, 26 three of the largest
categories of abuses perpetrated by the Burmese junta. 27 Similarly, all
E.U. Member States are signatories to the Convention of the Rights of
the Child, which forbids the use of child soldiers.'28 Thus, human rights
abuses are clearly "public morals" under the Panel's definition.
Finally, reference to other international treaties and practices (as
made by the United States-Gambling Panel) buttresses the conclusion
that "public morals" include human rights standards. As previously
noted, Article XX has little legislative history, largely because the excep-
tions were seen as mirroring the terms of past international trade
agreements. Many of these trade agreements included moral excep-
123. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
124. Id. art. 9 ("[fjreedom of thought, conscience and religion"); id. art. 10 ("[flreedom
of expression"); id. art. I I ("[fireedom of assembly and association").
125. Protocol No. 11 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 1994, E.T.S. No. 155 (entered into force Nov. 1,
1998).
126. ECHR, supra note 123, art. 4.
127. See supra Part II.
128. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 56, at 7.
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tions, 9 and included in this category were such varied items as "opium,
pornography, liquor, slaves, firearms, blasphemous articles, products
linked to animal cruelty, prize fight films, and abortion-inducing
drugs."' However, to the extent that the legislative history (travaux pre-
paratoires, to use the precise term in international law) are relevant to
confirming the interpretation argued above,'3' there is evidence that these
exceptions encompassed far more than obscene and controversial items.
For example, in 1927, twenty-nine countries (including Great Britain,
Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and the
United States) signed the Multilateral Abolition of Import and Export
Prohibitions and Restrictions."3 Similar to the GATT, this treaty allowed
trade-restrictive measures only under certain circumstances. First, the
measures could "[not be] applied in such a manner as to constitute a
means of arbitrary discrimination between two foreign countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade" (language nearly identical to the Article XX chapeau).' Second,
the measures had to fall into one of several categories, including:
2. Prohibitions or restrictions imposed on moral or humanitar-
ian grounds.
3. Prohibitions or restrictions imposed for the protection of pub-
lic health or for the protection of animals or plants against
disease, insects, and harmful parasites.
3 4
When this treaty reached the U.S. Senate for ratification, two Senators
engaged in a floor debate as to whether or not "moral or humanitarian
grounds" included goods produced in violation of labor standards.'35 As a
result, the final resolution ratifying the treaty included language
129. For a more thorough discussion of moral exceptions in pre-GATT trade agreements,
see Steve Chamovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 689, 698-701
(1998).
130. Id. at 717.
131. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties permits recourse to the
travaux preparatoires in order to confirm an interpretation based on, inter alia, the language
of the text and the purpose, object, and context of that wording, or to address textual ambigu-
ity. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679.
132. International Convention on the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and
Restrictions, Nov. 8, 1927, 46 Stat. 2461,97 L.N.T.S. 393 (not in force).
133. Id. art. 4.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Charnovitz, supra note 129, at 707-08.
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expressing the Senate's understanding that the "moral exception" would
"permit parties to ban imports made by 'forced or slave labor however
employed.' ,,136 Accordingly, there is historical support for the inclusion
of "forced labor," at the very least, in the definition of "public morals."
2. "Necessary"
A trade-restrictive measure must not only protect public morals, but
it must be "necessary" to do so. In United States-Gambling, the Appel-
late Body found that "necessary" was an objective standard necessitating
a three-pronged test. 37 First, a panel must assess the "relative importance
of the interests or values furthered by the challenged measure."'38 Next, a
panel must "weig[h] and balance[e]" other factors, particularly the "con-
tribution of the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it" and
"the restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce."'' 39 Fi-
nally, a panel must compare the measure with possible alternatives, "and
the results of such comparison should be considered in the light of the
importance of the interests at issue.'' O
Under the United States-Gambling analysis, trade sanctions due to
human rights abuses would likely be deemed "necessary." First, human
rights are undoubtedly an "important" interest. In United States-
Gambling, the Appellate Body appears to have accepted largely without
question that the United States' concerns regarding "money laundering,
fraud, compulsive gambling, and underage gambling" constituted "im-
portant" interests that could justify the gambling prohibition. '' We
would therefore expect that human rights concerns such as the use of
forced labor and child soldiers would be accorded even greater weight-
especially in light of the large number of domestic and international
measures attempting to eradicate these abuses. Thus, the first prong of
the United States-Gambling test should be satisfied easily.
Second, the trade sanctions would need to be weighed based on the
"contribution of the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it"
and the "restrictive impact ... on international commerce."''42 In United
States-Gambling, the Appellate Body determined that the U.S. prohibi-
tion on gambling was "linked" to a number of identified interests,
including the abovementioned money laundering, fraud, and underage
136. Id. at 708 (quoting 71 CONG. REC. 3744, 3785 (1929)).
137. United States-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 112,H9 304-07.
138. Id. 1306.
139. Id.
140. Id. 1307.
141. Id. 108.
142. Id. $ 306.
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gambling.13 These links were sufficient to constitute a "contribution of
the measure to the realization of the ends pursued by it."'" This standard,
then, is a relatively loose one, and the connection between a trade em-
bargo and the protection of public morals should be sufficiently evident
to satisfy this requirement. Similarly, the United States-Gambling Ap-
pellate Body found that although the U.S. prohibition on Internet
gambling had a significant restrictive impact on international commerce
(since it prevented foreign gambling websites from acquiring U.S. cus-
tomers), "strict controls" were necessary in order to protect the United
States' important interests.45 As noted above, human rights would likely
be considered an even more important interest than preventing gambling.
Accordingly, the Appellate Body would likely find that although a trade
embargo would have a significant restrictive impact on international
commerce, "strict controls" would nonetheless be necessary to satisfy a
Member State's important interest in protecting public morals. Here, the
targeting of the sanctions in the November 2007 Common Position to
imports of goods that are significant sources of revenue for the Burmese
regime indicates a clear link between the conduct that raises concerns of
public morals and the measures that are being justified under Article XX.
Third, and finally, trade sanctions would have to be compared with
possible alternatives, to see if "another, WTO-consistent measure is 'rea-
sonably available.' ,,146 In United States-Gambling, the Appellate Body
made clear that this prong does not require a Member State to "identify
the universe of less trade-restrictive alternative measures"; rather, a
Member must simply show that the measure is "significantly closer to
the pole of 'indispensable' than to the opposite pole of simply 'making a
contribution to.' ,,141 In the case of human rights abuses, a Member State
should be able to make the argument that a trade embargo is "indispen-
sable." Just as the United States' gambling ban was deemed "necessary"
to protect U.S. interests largely based on the importance of the issues at
stake, here too we would expect a similar result. If a Member's public
morals are offended by trading with an abusive country, nothing less
than a full embargo will sufficiently protect this interest. Thus, trade
sanctions due to human rights abuses would satisfy the United States-
Gambling three-pronged test and qualify under Article XX(a).
In this case, it is particularly relevant that the United States and the
international community, through the United Nations, have made
143. Id. 313.
144. Id. 1306.
145. Id. 1323.
146. Id. 1307.
147. Id. 9 309-10 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports
of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef, $ 161, WT/DSI69/AB/R (Dec. I 1, 2000)).
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persistent efforts to engage constructively with the Burmese regime to
address these most serious of human rights abuses. In particular, there
have been thirty resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly,
U.N. Human Rights Council, and former U.N. Commission on Human
Rights urging the Burmese junta to reform itself and curb its human
rights abuses.' 48 And the International Labor Organization, in particular,
has made intensive efforts at documenting forced labor and attempting to
change the regime's behavior.4 1 In this case, therefore, it is indeed
appropriate to conclude that sanctions here are a last resort, reflecting the
abject failure of such efforts due to the non-cooperation of the regime, as
well as the evident failure of the earlier less stringent E.U. sanctions
regime.
As a final matter, this usage of trade sanctions should be distin-
guished from Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages (Mexico-Soft Drinks), a recent dispute under a different pro-
vision of Article XX."O In this case, the United States challenged a
Mexican tax on all imported soft drinks containing sweeteners other than
cane sugar. In response, Mexico argued that its measure was needed in
order to force the United States to adhere to certain NAFTA commit-
ments. Therefore, Mexico claimed that the provisions were justified
under Article XX exception (d): "necessary to secure compliance with
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Agreement."'' In ruling that Mexico's sanctions did not qualify for this
exception, the Appellate Body held that the terms "laws or regulations"
in exception (d) "do not include obligations of another WTO Member
under an international agreement."'5 2 This ruling is based entirely upon
the Appellate Body's interpretation of the particular language in Article
XX(d) "laws and regulations" and is not relevant to whether sanctions
linked to a violation of international obligations can be justified under
Article XX(a). Moreover, in Mexico-Soft Drinks, the Appellate Body
noted that even the language in Article XX(d) that it had interpreted re-
strictively as not including international legal rules, would include
domestic laws and regulations implementing those international rules,
148. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61/232, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/232 (Dec. 22, 2006); U.N. Human
Rights Council, Portugal (on behalf of the European Union): Draft Resolution 6/... Situation
of human rights in Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-5/L.1/Rev.I (Oct. 2, 2007); Comm'n on
Human Rights, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Question of the Violation of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World: Mynammar, U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/2005/L.29 (Apr. 11, 2005).
149. See supra Part I(B)(3).
150. Appellate Body Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Bever-
ages, WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Mexico-Soft Drinks].
151. GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XX(d).
152. Mexico-Soft Drinks, supra note 150, 69.
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bringing into the question in fact the significance of the restrictive read-
ing of Article XX(d).'53
B. The "Chapeau" ofArticle XX
Once it is determined that a measure falls within a valid Article XX
category, the provision must next be analyzed for consistency with the Ar-
ticle's chapeau. As previously noted, the chapeau requires that a measure
must "not [be] applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.' '54 The
Member State seeking the exception has the burden of showing that its
measure satisfies these requirements.'
The Dispute Settlement Body first comprehensively considered the
chapeau in United States-Shrimp/Turtle. In this case, India, Malaysia,
Pakistan, and Thailand challenged a U.S. import ban on shrimp caught
without the use of turtle protective technology. In response, the United
States argued that its ban was justified under Article XX(g) as "in relation
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.', 5 6 The Appellate
Body agreed with the United States, holding that the measure was indeed
valid under Article XX(g)'57; next, they moved on to the chapeau.
Ultimately, the Appellate Body concluded that several aspects of the
United States' ban constituted unjustified and arbitrary discrimination in
violation of the chapeau: the failure of the ban to take into account differ-
ent conditions in different Member States"'58; U.S. negotiation of
multilateral environmental treaties with some, but not all, banned coun-
tries159; and a "phase-in" period for some countries but not others.' 6°
153. Compare id. [ 69-70, with id. 79 ("[Wle conclude that the terms 'laws or regula-
tions' cover rules that form part of the domestic legal system of a 'WTO Member, including
rules deriving from international agreements that have been incorporated into the domestic
legal system of a WTO Member or have direct effect according to that WTO Member's legal
system." (footnote omitted)).
154. GATr 1947, supra note 5, art. XX.
155. See United States-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra note 112, 1307-09.
156. GATT 1947, supra note 5, art. XX(d).
157. United States-ShrimpiTurtle, supra note 109, 125-45.
158. Id. [ 162-64.
159. Id. $ 169-72. But see United States-Gambling Appellate Body Report, supra
note 112, 1315-17 (clarifying that prior negotiation is not a necessary component of an
Article XX exception).
160. United States-Shrimp/Turtle, supra note 109, 1lJ 173-76. The United States altered
its implementation of the statute in light of the Appellate Body ruling, and in a later decision,
reviewing these changes, the Appellate Body decided that they were adequate to bring the
United States in compliance with the chapeau. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Malaysia, 154, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001).
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Despite these findings, the Appellate Body made sure to leave the door
open for future measures, stipulating that "[w]e have not decided that sov-
ereign States should not act together bilaterally, plurilaterally or
multilaterally... to protect endangered species or to otherwise protect the
environment. Clearly, they should and do.' 16' Rather, the Appellate Body
simply held that although the United States ban was legitimate under Arti-
cle XX(g), it was applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. 62
Like United States-ShrimplTurtle, trade sanctions due to human
rights abuses would violate the chapeau if they did not "treat like countries
alike." However, in the case of Burma, the chapeau should not pose an
obstacle. Applying the United States-Shrimp/Turtle test for "unjustified
and arbitrary discrimination," it is clear that although trade sanctions
would undoubtedly constitute "discrimination," in the case of Burma,
sanctions would be neither "unjustified or arbitrary," nor "discrimination
between countries in which the same conditions prevail." This is because
Member States have good reason to single out Burma.
Although other WTO Members have at times faced criticism for hu-
man rights abuses, the situation in Burma has garnered unprecedented
international action and condemnation. First, Burma is distinguished by its
persistent defiance of the ILO. As previously noted, the junta's practice of
forced labor is sufficiently widespread and severe that in 2000, the ILO
made an unprecedented move-for the first and only time, the ILO
adopted a resolution under Article 33 to compel the junta to adhere to its
obligations under the Forced Labor Convention. As of 2007, the junta had
yet to comply with any of the ILO's recommended changes.16 Burma's
miserable human rights record has also attracted unparalleled condemna-
tion by the United Nations. As of 2007, Burma has been the subject of an
astounding thirty resolutions by the U.N. General Assembly's U.N. Hu-
man Rights Council, and former U.N. Human Rights Commission. These
resolutions have condemned the junta's use of forced labor, the regime's
political repression, and the government's overall abysmal human rights
record.'64 On September 15, 2006, the U.N. Security Council voted 10-4-1
to add Burma to its formal agenda, 65 meaning that Security Council
Members are now entitled to raise Burma as an item for question, and re-
quest regular reports from the U.N. Secretariat.)
161. Id. 185.
162. See id. 1186.
163. ILO Press Release, supra note 40.
164. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/197, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/197 (Mar. 9, 1995).
165. See Judy Aita, U.N. Security Council Sets Formal Review of Situation in Burma,
AMERICA.GOV, Sept. 15, 2006, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/September/
20060915181057AJatiA0.7863886.html
166. UN Votes to Put Burma on Agenda, BBC NEWS, Sept. 16, 2006, hup://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5351246.stm. Despite having the affirmative nine votes to
[Vol. 29:165
EU Trade Sanctions
This unprecedented international condemnation distinguishes Burma
from certain other WTO Members with questionable human rights re-
cords. This is not a case, as in United States-Shrimp/Turtle, in which,
under the application of the scheme addressed in the first Appellate Body
report, similarly-situated countries were treated differently. Burma's hu-
man rights situation is exceptional, as is its failure even to engage with the
international community and responsible regional powers concerning this
issue. Thus, trade sanctions would not be "discrimination between coun-
tries in which the same conditions prevail," nor would they be unjustified
or arbitrary. United States-Shrimp/Turtle made clear that Article XX does
not prohibit Member States from enacting sanctions targeted at particular
policies in order to protect important interests, so long as these provisions
are applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Accordingly, trade sanctions
against Burma are WTO-compliant restrictions that would be fairly tar-
geted at a distinctively bad actor. It may well be the case that there could
be other human rights situations in other WTO Members that in some as-
pects are as serious as those in Burma. In these other cases, there may be
other political, economic, diplomatic, or military options available to ad-
dress the situation and a different policy calculus concerning the costs and
benefits of sanctions. We note that the chapeau does not prohibit selectiv-
ity as such with respect to countries targeted by sanctions, but only
selectivity that is inherently unreasonable, i.e., arbitrary or unjustifiable.
Given the severity of the situation in Burma, the European Union
would be able to justify a full ban on trade with Burma. Certainly, then,
the ban in the November 2007 Common Position on imports of textiles,
timber, gems, and precious metals would also be WTO-compliant. Ulti-
mately, any such sanctions would be removed in accordance with the
procedure described in the E.U. Common Position itself. 16 7 In the United
States-Shrimp/Turtle case, it is to be noted, the Appellate Body initially
held that the United States had violated the conditions of the chapeau by
rigidly applying benchmarks from a domestic U.S. regulatory scheme to
determine the conditions under which imports could enter the United
States, regardless of the conditions in the exporting countries, and without
adopt a resolution on the situation in Burma, a non-punitive resolution was subsequently ve-
toed by China and Russia, both permanent members of the Security Council. Press Release,
Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Myanmar, Owing to
Negative Votes by China, Russian Federation, U.N. Doc SC/8939 (Jan. 12, 2007).
167. See Council Position 2006/318/CFSP, supra note 58. Clause 8 of the preamble
states in pertinent part: "In the event of a substantial improvement in the overall political situa-
tion in Burma/Myanmar, the suspension of these restrictive measures and a gradual
resumption of cooperation with Burma/Myanmar will be considered, after the Council has
assessed developments." Id. pmbl. This provision of the 2006 Common Position has not been
amended in the Common Position of November 2007 and thus remains in force. See Common
Position No. 2007/750/CFSP, supra note 3.
Winter 2008]
Michigan Journal of International Law
flexibility as to the means by which those countries could achieve the le-
gitimate environmental objectives in question. In the case of Burma,
however, the norms in question are widely, and in many cases universally
recognized, human rights, some of which have the status of jus cogens
(peremptory) norms. The judgment that Burma is not in conformity with
these norms, and is not making good faith efforts to address its violations,
is one that has been echoed throughout various international institutions,
in numerous acts of formal censure. As we suggest, there is no reason why
the enhanced E.U. sanctions in the November 2007 Common Position
could not be accompanied by a transparent, objective process to determine
whether Burma is making serious good faith efforts to improve its human
rights performance-a process that could rely heavily on the views of
multilateral organizations and respected independent non-governmental
organizations.
VI. ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION
As noted, Article 2(e) of the November 2007 Common Position pro-
vides that knowing and intentional participation in activity that has the
object or effect of circumventing the trade ban is to be prohibited. One
obvious means of circumventing the ban would be to transship the inter-
dicted goods from a third country, concealing their Burmese origin.
However, parties involved in such activity might attempt to set up a de-
fense for themselves under E.U. law by having the goods processed or
transformed in some way in the third country. This might be thought to
allow them to claim that what has been done to the goods in the third
country would make them, as a legal matter, goods from the third country
and not from Burma. As a matter of internal E.U. law, there would be a
question of interpretation as to whether the intent of the anti-
circumvention provision is to suspend the otherwise applicable rules of
origin in the European Union, where these rules are manipulated to cir-
cumvent the ban in Article 2(b). Under Article 4(3) of the new E.U.
Regulation, the origin of goods shall be determined by reference to Regu-
lation (EEC) No. 2913/92.68 And, Article 24 of that Regulation states that
"[g]oods whose production involved more than one country shall be
deemed to originate in the country where they underwent their last, sub-
stantial, economically justified processing or working in an undertaking
equipped for that purpose and resulting in the manufacture of a new prod-
uct or representing an important stage of manufacture."' 69
168. Id. art. 4(3); see Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92, Establishing the
Community Customs Code, 1992 O.J. (L 302) 1.
169. Id. art. 24.
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Arguably, it is precisely because of such rules of origin, that an anti-
circumvention clause is required, to prevent the trade sanctions being ren-
dered ineffective through processing in third countries. If such an
interpretation were adopted by the relevant E.U. authorities, the third
countries from which the goods in question were shipped might attempt to
bring an action in the WTO against the European Union, arguing that con-
siderations of public morals cannot justify a ban on imports from a third
country that itself is not engaging in the underlying conduct that raises
public morals concerns. Yet there is nothing in Article XX(a) of the GATT
that suggests that a measure, to be justified under that provision, must be
exclusively addressed to the State engaged in the conduct in question. The
issue under Article XX(a) is whether the measure is "necessary" to protect
public morals, and therefore whether without anti-circumvention action
with respect to goods altered in a third country and then shipped into the
European Union, the ban would be ineffective or significantly less effec-
tive in addressing the underlying conduct of the Burmese junta. The
experience thus far of the United States, where the legislation banning
Burmese imports does not include such an anti-circumvention provision,
suggests that the lack of such action against goods altered in and shipped
from third countries considerably weakens the ability of the sanctions to
achieve their legitimate purpose under Article XX(a). The U.S. govern-
ment, therefore, recently closed this loophole. Congress adopted and
President George W. Bush signed legislation that redefines Burmese rubies
and jadeite as being gemstones that are "mined or extracted in Burma,"
thereby limiting the prospect of circumventing sanctions through substan-
tial transformation.
7 0
It should be noted that even if a WTO adjudicator were to find that
such action against shipments against third countries were not justifiable
as necessary for the protection of public morals under Article XX(a), the
measure would still be justifiable under Article XX(d) as necessary to "se-
cure compliance with laws and regulations which are not inconsistent with
the provisions of [the GATT], including customs enforcement ... ,171 The
ban in Article 2(b) of the Common Position is clearly such a law or regula-
tion; and, since the primary ban is justified under Article XX(a) for public
morals reasons, the additional anti-circumvention measure to ensure its
effective enforcement would qualify under Article XX(d) as a measure
170. Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-286, § 6, 122 Stat. 2632, 2638 (2008); Jennifer Loven, Bush Signs Myanmar
Sanctions Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 29, 2008, available at http://www.wtop.com/?nid=
116&sid=1 177265.
171. GA'Ir 1947, supra note 5, art. XX(d).
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necessary to secure compliance with laws and regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions172 of the GAIT.
Finally, it might be asked why the European Union, instead of requir-
ing that the activity of circumvention be prohibited, has not simply
amended the rules of origin so as to ensure that goods sourced from
Burma but altered in a third country are considered goods of Burmese ori-
gin within the meaning of Article 2(b) itself, and thereby prohibited entry
into the European Union. The answer may be in part that such an approach
would risk a challenge under the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin,
which requires, inter alia, that rules of origin "shall not discriminate be-
tween other Members" of the WTO,'73 i.e., that they must apply on an
MFN basis. Article I of the Agreement on Rules of Origin defines the
scope of the disciplines in that Agreement by limiting the meaning of rules
of origin to "those laws, regulations and administrative determinations of
general application applied by any Member to determine the country of
origin of goods."' 7 4 By contrast, the anti-circumvention provision in the
November 2007 Common Position does not amend any law, regulation, or
administrative determination of general application concerning the origin
of goods, but rather entails an inquiry into whether the particular conduct
of a particular party knowingly and intentionally circumvented the trade
ban in object or effect. Liability arises under this provision not because the
goods are deemed to be of Burmese origin, but because the conduct is
deemed to be of a circumventing nature.
VII. CONCLUSION
The situation in Burma is dire and this instability has only been high-
lighted by the recent mass protests and brutal crackdown. The former
democracy is mired in economic and social stagnation, and its people are
controlled by a repressive and abusive military regime. In that context,
countries have taken different approaches with regards to trade sanctions.
Officials in Europe have sometimes suggested that strengthening the, until
recently, mild sanctions could constitute a violation of WTO legal obliga-
tions. However, an examination of the strengthened sanctions contained in
the November 2007 Common Position suggests that, while likely in vari-
ous respects, a violation of Articles I, lII, and XI, of the GATT, these
enhanced measures could be justified as consistent with the Article XX(a)
exception as "necessary to protect public morals."
172 Id.
173. WTO Rules of Origin, supra note 95, art. 2(d) (emphasis added).
174. Id. art. 1.
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